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The Jargon of ‘Law and Order’: From Nazism to the Trump Campaign via Heidegger 
 
 
…it isn’t only Nazi actions that have to vanish, but also the Nazi cast 
of mind, the typical Nazi way of thinking and its breeding-ground; 
the language of Nazism.1 
 
The atrocities of the Second World War were supposed to be the greatest scar on the conscience of 
Western, liberal, democracies. Nazism is so etched in our minds as a byword for the evil that human 
beings are capable of inflicting on others as to be cliché. Yet the far-right is more powerful, globally, 
than at any point since the 1930s.
2
 How is this possible? 
Many elements have contributed to this extraordinary moment. The respective roles of economic 
factors,
3
 social media,
4
 and a general sense of ‘fear’5 are well-documented. Academia has played an 
important part in the creation of this environment too. While Nazism was defeated militarily and its 
political apparatus destroyed, the works of its most celebrated philosophers have flourished in the 
post-war era.  This paper is a call to those of us who have used writers like Martin Heidegger as 
philosophical guides in the past to reassess how we engage with this tradition.  When we perpetuate 
these ideas, even in abstract, philosophical discussions, we unwittingly perpetuate a conception of the 
relationship between human beings and the world that is conducive to far-right political and legal 
goals. 
In the first section, I explore how the ‘language of Nazism’ twisted concepts such as ‘law’ and ‘order’ 
towards Nazi political ends. In the second, I explain how Donald Trump’s self-description as the ‘law 
                                                          
1
 See Victor Klemperer The Language of the Third Reich, translated by Martin Brady, (London and New 
Brunswick: Athlone Press, 2000)  2 
2
 “‘White Europe’: 60,000 Nationalists March on Poland’s Independence Day” The Guardian November 12, 
2017. 
3
 See Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution 
in Reverse” Perspectives on Politics 15 (2) (2017) pp.443-454 
4
 See Brian McNair “From Control to Chaos and Back Again” Journalism Studies 18(1) (2017) p.1 
5
 See, Mathew C. MacWilliams “Intolerant and Afraid: Authoritarians Rise to Trump’s Call” in Why Irrational 
Politics Appeals – Understanding the Allure of Trumpism in Mari Fitzduff, ed., (Connecticut: Praeger 
Publishers, 2017) pp.121-138, and Karen Stenner The Authoritarian Dynamic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
and order candidate’ only makes sense if understood as a contemporary form of the same exercise.  In 
the third, I illustrate how Heidegger-inspired analysis of Nazi law normalizes not only Nazi law itself, 
but the underlying philosophy that justified Nazi law. Academia thus plays a part in the creation of a 
political culture that is conducive to far-right politics. We have normalized the underlying 
philosophical commitments; and so we normalize the conclusions even if we disagree with them.  
The point in all of this is not to dismiss Heidegger’s work. He remains among the most important 
philosophers of the twentieth century.  We could not remove this tradition from our intellectual 
landscape if we tried; it is far too deeply embedded. My point instead is that we must re-evaluate how 
we engage with work within the Heideggerian tradition.  Heidegger scholars (including me) have 
tended to introduce his work in terms of its qualities and its possibilities for enriching discourse; we 
should not do so without also contemplating its flaws.  We must present this tradition through a prism 
of coming to grips with the reasons why such a conception of the relationship between human beings 
and the world should lend itself towards far-right positions in law and politics.  In my conclusions I 
suggest that we should place the notion of ‘being-wrong’ at the core of our engagement with this 
tradition. 
I. Jargon, Law, and Order 
Nazism had a philosophical wing. Heidegger was the most notable figure.
6
 This wing aimed to 
provide a philosophical grounding for the volkish ideology that came to dominate Nazism. Such 
grounding required a perversion of language. Nazi philosophy turned every debate into an imposition 
of will.  To do so, it forced out typical understandings of concepts and inserted radically different ones 
                                                          
6
 Heidegger’s relationship with the Nazi party was complex; though as more evidence comes to light, it has been 
increasingly difficult to defend, see in particular Martin Heidegger Ponderings II-VI: Black Notebooks 1931-
1938 translated by Richard Rojcewicz, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016) and Ingo Farin and 
Jeff Malpas, eds., Reading Heidegger’s Black Notebooks 1931-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Massachussetts Institute 
of Technology, 2016). There is a vast literature on this issue, see Emmanuel Faye Heidegger: The Introduction 
of Nazism into Philosophy translated by Michael Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), Richard 
Wolin The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990), Richard Wolin The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader  (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), Rüdiger Safranski Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil translated by Edward Osers 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp.225-389, and Hans Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis: 
Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993). 
in their place. I borrow from Adorno by referring to the Nazi versions as ‘jargon’, but other writers 
have referred to the same phenomenon in different ways.
7
    
It is difficult to pin exact commitments to this philosophical form.  The style deliberately rambles and 
there is little attempt at consistency (rebelling against such qualities was, in part, the point).  There are 
five broad steps.  Let us use this as a rough initial outline before we discuss specific issues: 
1. The most important step is an abandonment of any sense that word meaning is fixed.. In 
twentieth century analytical philosophy of language, theories of word meaning fall into two 
broad camps. Some hold that word-meaning is a matter of ‘reference’ to some object or 
phenomenon in the ‘external’ world.8 Others hold that the meaning of a word is determined 
by ordinary or conventional ‘use’.9 The first step in the creation of jargon is to deny each of 
these.  Jargon painstakingly discusses the meaning of individual words. But ‘meaning’ resides 
in the subject.
10
  With nothing to fix meaning – no object and no convention –literal and 
figurative use of words is blurred.
11
 
 
2. Since nothing acts as ultimate arbiter of meaning, alternative positions are ‘negated’ rather 
than ‘refuted’. That is to say, there is no argument on the basis of the relevant issues or 
substantive points.
12
 Counter-arguments are dismissed on the grounds of some personal 
                                                          
7
 Theodor Adorno The Jargon of Authenticity translated by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: 
Routledge 2003). Klemperer, a philologist, referred to this as Tiefenstil (stylistic profundity), see The Language 
of the Third Reich pp.256-257, see also Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger translated 
by Peter Collier (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) 
8
 See Gottlob Frege “On Sense and Reference” in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege Max Black and Peter Geach, eds., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960) pp.56-78 
9
 See John L. Austin How to do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). 
10
 Adorno, Jargon, p.71, 102. 
11
 Op. cit. p.28. Sporting analogies were used similarly, Klemperer, Language of the Third Reich, pp. 230-236. 
For a contemporary example see Oren Ben-Dor, Thinking About Law: In Silence With Heidegger (Oxford and 
Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2007).  As I discuss elsewhere, these false equivalences trivialize real suffering, 
see [REDACTED].  This ‘humanism’ was radically dehumanizing, a jargon of ‘Human’ replaced humanity, see 
Adorno Jargon pp.53-54, see also Bourdieu, Political Ontology p.68. 
12
 See Adorno Jargon pp.1-2, 76 and Bourdieu Political Ontology p.23, 82.  
attribute, from race to a general ‘lack of spirituality’.13 Debate is thus avoided.14 If meaning is 
relative, this is to be expected. There is nothing to debate. All matters are ‘personal’. 
 
3. Jargon avoids definitions. The vocabulary is very ‘matter-of-fact’ and ‘down-to-earth’. Yet no 
definition is put forward.  Concepts are explained almost entirely negatively, with emphatic 
statements about how wrong existing understandings are.
15
  
 
4. Firmness of belief (or ‘strength’) is prioritized for its own sake. This is often equated with 
‘spirituality’. If there is no objective or conventional meaning, as per step one, there is 
nothing to which one might appeal by way of support for a position. This undermines the 
notion of demonstration via evidence.  Those who require proof – scientists and other experts 
- are said to lack ‘authenticity’.   Critical self-reflection is seen as a ‘subjective deviation’, a 
sign of weakness.
16
  
 
5. Finally, all quests for and claims about ‘true’ meaning are seen as political. Everything is part 
of an agenda. The solution to multiple, competing interests is always a strong figurehead or a 
commanding source from ‘the Greeks’ to ‘German tradition’ to Heidegger’s claim that ‘only a 
God can save us’.17 Supposedly radical approaches to meaning are thus resolved in 
authoritarian, retrograde ways. 
While the reader may already have identified some similarities between ‘jargon’ and contemporary 
political discourse, it may be difficult to imagine how all of this would work in the abstract.  The idea 
of law as ‘order’ provides a simple illustration.  It is common in mainstream legal philosophy.18  
                                                          
13
 See Adorno Jargon pp.48-49 and Bourdieu Political Ontology p. 64. 
14
 Klemperer provides a good example, from personal experience op. cit., n. 9, pp.103-124. 
15
 See Adorno Jargon pp.67-68 and Bourdieu Political Ontology p.36, 90.  
16
 See also Klemperer on the term ‘fanatical’, which used to have negative connotations, Language of the Third 
Reich pp.57-61.  Similarly, evolution of the term ‘historic’ mirrors that of Nazism, op. cit., p.221. 
17
 Adorno, Jargon pp.28-9, see also Faye Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism pp.113-150.   
18
 There are multiple further examples of ‘jargon’ in law, for which Heidegger was largely responsible.  Ian 
Ward notes Heidegger’s warped version of ‘freedom’ (equated with ‘responsibility’) in Law, Philosophy and 
National Socialism: Heidegger, Schmitt and Radbruch in Context (New York: Peter Lang, 1992) pp.101-103.  
Writers such as Lon Fuller and John Rawls, broadly (and non-controversially) took law as order to 
mean a system that is rule-based, and at least partly prescribed.  Carl Schmitt equates law with 
‘concrete order’ in his Nazi-era writings.19  But Schmitt’s concept contains little by way of system, is 
non-normative, and its basic principles are un-enumerated. To create this twisted concept of order, 
Schmitt takes each of the steps that we have identified as key features of ‘jargon’. 
1. Schmitt relativizes ‘order’.  For Schmitt, concepts of law vary according to ‘peoples’, ‘race’ 
and ‘era’.20 In an anti-Semitic allusion, he claims that certain peoples “exist only in law”, 
because they have no church, no territories and no land. As a result, they would find the 
‘Germanic’ concept of concrete order ‘inconceivable, mystical, fantastic and ridiculous’.21 
Even this ‘Germanic’ concept is not fixed by anything measurable – popular opinion or 
common use, for example.  
 
2. Next, Schmitt negates more conventional understandings of order. Consider the following 
claim:  
For concrete-order thinking, “order” is also not juristically primarily “rule” or a 
summation of rules, but, conversely, rule is only a component and a medium of 
order….The norm or rule does not create the order; on the contrary, only on the 
basis and in the framework of a given order does it have a certain regulating function 
with a relatively small degree of validity.
22
 
Schmitt does not point out flaws in the notion that public order is fundamentally rule-based.  
He does not consider counter-arguments, or note any specific scholar.  Throughout, he talks of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See also Heidegger’s claim that Germany’s exit from the League of Nations was a ‘turning towards’ the 
‘community of peoples’, op. cit., pp.107-08. 
19
 For analysis of the link between Heidegger war-era Schmitt see Ward Law, Philosophy and National 
Socialism pp.117-20 and Faye Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism pp.151-172.  Schmitt’s position 
fluctuated greatly.  Shortly before the 1932 elections he warned against voting for the National Socialists, see 
“Der Missbrauch der Legalitaet” Taegliche Rundschau July 19, 1932. Here, we are only concerned with his 
Nazi writings.    
20
 Carl Schmitt On the Three Types of Juristic Thought translated by Joseph W. Bendersky (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2004) p.45 
21
 Op. cit. 
22
 Op. cit. pp.48-49 
‘overcoming’ the notion of order as rule-based.23 He never sets out reasons why this might be 
flawed. Relativizing the concept by ‘peoples’ in step one, has led to this second feature. One’s 
understanding of the concept is predetermined by one’s race: there is no point in trying to 
convince, as there is no fixed ‘real’ meaning either objectively or inter-subjectively. 
3. Schmitt provides no definition of ‘concrete-order’ in any of the publications in which he 
discusses the term.  Insofar as we can glean a loose description, concrete order is non-
normative.  It is organic, hence ‘organization’ rather than ‘system’;24 it naturally occurs within 
institutions and communities, without the need for prescription from outside.  It is ‘spiritual’; 
only “initiates” who directly experience it can actually feel it.25  Yet this ‘concrete order’ is 
said to be ‘down-to-earth’. Adorno notes that this aspect masks an instruction behind the 
language of factual description, or the prediction of something that will ‘inevitably’ happen – 
“that is the way it is done here” actually tells people to “do it this way”.26 It was a hallmark of 
Nazism that many atrocities were conducted via such double-entendre.  Heidegger’s 
philosophy refers to listening to ‘the unsaid’.27 A favourite claim of Holocaust deniers is that 
there is no evidence of a command to execute Jews.
28
  There did not have to be.  Loyal Nazi 
‘initiates’ were, by law, the only ones that could hold positions of power in the legal system, 
the police force, the judiciary, the government or the army.
29
  Nazi senior officialdom banked 
on the notion that such party loyalists could be trusted to act in the interests of the cause 
without express direction.  
 
                                                          
23
 Op. cit. p.48. 
24
 As Klemperer notes, the term ‘system’ carried connotations of the Weimar Republic; Nazism spoke of an 
‘organization’ instead.  See Klemperer, Language of the Third Reich pp.97-102. Trump talked of a 
‘rigged’/‘broken’ system and highlighted the ‘Trump Organization’ as evidence of his leadership. 
25
 Heidegger uses the term ‘initiate’ in a different context, but it captures Schmitt’s meaning, see Schmitt Three 
Types, pp.45-50 and Martin Heidegger “Letter on Humanism” reproduced in full in Basic Writings: Martin 
Heidegger translated by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.217-265, at 263. 
26
 See Adorno Jargon p.71, 86. 
27
 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1959) 134 
28
 See David Irving Hitler’s War (New York: Viking Press, 1977) 
29
 See the “Law for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service” (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des 
Berufsbeamtentums) Reichsgesetzblatt (April 7, 1933) 
4. Schmitt repeats these ideas forcefully.  The term ‘concrete’ suggests something tangible and 
defined. Yet no evidence is introduced for this ‘order’ – Schmitt does not point to any aspect 
of German civic life at the time that operates more smoothly than the equivalent in ‘liberal’ 
societies.  The quest for ‘evidence’ itself is described as a product of ‘normativistic’ 
thinking.
30
 The closest Schmitt comes to factual support are references to German culture of 
the pre-Roman era.  He repeatedly claims that law reform should be a matter of removing 
Roman laws from German law.  This became a common Nazi claim, but it had no basis in 
fact. Their picture of pre-Roman German society was wildly inaccurate.
31
  In addition, 
German Common Law and Roman law systems had become so intermixed by the twentieth 
century that extracting one from the other would have been impossible; it was not even clear 
by that point which elements had their origins in which source.
32
   
 
5. Finally, the result is a recommendation to preserve power structures. Schmitt justifies the 
existing regime - an authoritarian one – and he does so explicitly. Just as Heidegger appealed 
to German Tradition, a God and The Greeks, Schmitt appeals to German Tradition and a 
Führer.  Various outcomes that were, in fact, the imposition of individual wills, are portrayed 
as the products of a naturally occurring ‘concrete order’.33 The dictatorship is thus ‘natural’.  
                                                          
30
 Schmitt Three Types p.52, see also Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? Translated by Glenn Gray 
and Fred Wieck, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) and The Question Concerning Technology, and other 
essays, translated by William Lovitt (London and New York: Harper and Row, 1977). 
31
 It relied on Tacitus’ discredited account, The Agricola and the Germania translated by Harold Mattingly, 2nd 
ed. (London: Penguin, 2009), for problems with this source see J.B. Rives Tacitus: Germania (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999). I discuss this matter in more detail elsewhere, see [REDACTED]. 
32
 See Karl Lowenstein “Law in the Third Reich” Yale Law Journal 45 (5) (1936) p.779, pp.784-785. On 
Nazism’s perversion of history see George Mosse The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the 
Third Reich (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), pp.67-87, 154, 163, 301, 310, 311, Georg Lukács The 
Destruction of Reason translated by Peter Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1980) pp.742-744, Alan Beyerchen 
Scientists under Hitler (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977) p.123 and Hannsjoachim W. Koch, In the 
Name of the Volk: Political Justice in Hitler’s Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) pp.22-25. 
33
 See Schmitt Three Types, pp.48-54, 65, Adorno Jargon, pp.4-5, Bourdieu Political Ontology pp.75-76, and 
Hannah Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt, Inc., 1966) 
pp.348-350, 460-463. For discussion of case law examples see Koch In the Name of the Volk pp.15, 55, 82, 87, 
119. Michael Stolleis notes how this “concrete order” was neither “concrete” nor “order” The Law Under the 
Swastika: Studies in Legal History in Nazi Germany, translated by Thomas Dunlap (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998) pp.70-71, 98, 110-11.  
Once these steps have been taken, Schmitt is free to twist two further concepts that are vital to 
Western Liberal Democratic ideas of law.  The jargon of these concepts is the exact opposite of more 
typical understandings; a common move in Nazi philosophy.
34
 
First, for Schmitt, ‘rule of law’ has been misunderstood. ‘Normativistic’ understandings of ‘law’ and 
‘order’ would have it that ‘rule of law’ is the opposite of ‘rule of man’.  But the ‘concrete’, ‘German’ 
and ‘kingly’ notion of order has actually been ‘destroyed’ by this conception according to Schmitt.  
This is so, because various rules can be used against the ‘king’, ‘master’ or ‘overseer’.  ‘Rule of law’, 
in Schmitt’s jargon, actually is rule of man via Fuhrerordnung – or ‘leadership order’.35 
Next, Schmitt does the same thing with ‘order’ itself. “Normativity” and “concrete order” are on 
“completely different planes”.36  Norms are “naturally always in order” and so miss the “disorder” that 
may exist in a “concrete situation”.37  ‘Liberal’ understandings of ‘order’ mask or interfere with 
‘concrete order’. Schmitt does not reference specific writers. But something like Fuller’s notion of 
order – a functioning system, that regulates behaviour, in a rule-based, and public way38 - Schmitt 
would call disorder.  Similarly, anything Fuller might point to as a failure of the minimum standards of 
order (any of his eight failures to make law),
39
 Schmitt would regard as a failure on Fuller’s part to 
‘overcome’ normativistic thinking. There is “order”. But western, liberal, writers such as Fuller just do 
not understand it because they are the wrong sorts of ‘peoples’.  
All of this is done using jargon, in the manner exposed by Adorno and others.  Here, ‘overcoming’ 
what we normally think of as ‘order’ and ‘rule of law’ is used to justify disorder and rule of Führer. 
By all accounts, this so-called ‘concrete order’ actually led to fluidity and disorder.40 Many of the 
                                                          
34
 See Heidegger on ‘life’ as ‘being-towards-death’, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John 
MacQuarrie, and Eugene Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) pp.279-304, see also Faye’s analysis of 
Heidegger’s ‘Bremen Lectures’, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism, pp.302-315. 
35
 Schmitt Three Types, p.50. Antiquated terms replaced rule of law with unregulated, medieval notions of 
loyalty, see, for example Klemperer’s analysis of the term Gefolgschaft (followers), Language of the Third 
Reich pp.236-237. Koch notes further historically inaccuracy here, In the Name of the Volk pp.75-77 
36
 Schmitt Three Types, pp.52-3.  
37
 Op. cit. 
38
 See Lon Fuller The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), 106 and “The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication” Harvard Law Review 92 (2) (1978) p.353, p.357 
39
 Fuller Morality of Law pp.33-38. 
40
 See Stolleis, Law Under the Swastika. 
terms and institutions were given solemn-sounding names that evoked long-standing and tradition. For 
example, the Nazi equivalent contemporary Germany’s “Lawyers Association” (Vereinigung der 
Rechtsanwälte) was given an old German name that translates as “Alliance of defenders of the law” 
(Rechtswahrer Bund). This was a public relations exercise. It was used to mask the erosion of both 
rule of law and separation of powers.
41
 Textbook writers at the time found it difficult to provide an 
account of public law as a coherent system.
42
  Hans Sluga argues that the quest for a ‘more 
fundamental’ order, prevalent in Nazi philosophy, was largely an attempt to justify a state that was 
increasingly disordered on any conventional understanding.
43
  In this brief account, we see Schmitt 
embark upon the same quest with specific regard to law.   
 
II. Trump: The ‘Law and Order Candidate’ 
Every major far-right group in America endorsed or supported Trump’s candidacy.44 His campaign 
employed jargon as a means of encouraging that support. One example is Trump’s self-description as 
‘law and order candidate’.  This slogan originated in the presidential campaigns of Barry Goldwater 
and George Wallace in the 1960s.  Goldwater’s was regarded as racist and divisive (even within his 
own party).  Wallace was an overt anti-integrationist, who ran as an independent.  This was an era of 
great social change.  In addition to the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and urban race 
riots, there was a rise in juvenile delinquency and street crime (commensurate with increasing 
urbanization).  The concept of a threat to ‘law and order’ was used by Goldwater as a way of lumping 
each of these diffuse elements together and running in opposition to them all.  Often, civil rights 
protests of the era were instigated precisely because of illegal activity by police or other officials.  But 
Goldwater and Wallace never used the term ‘law and order’ to mean a due regard for the civil rights of 
black citizens.  They were no defenders of an increasing body of legislation and judicial decisions that 
                                                          
41
 See Klemperer Language of the Third Reich pp.237-238. 
42
 See Stolleis, Law Under the Swastika pp.98-111 
43
 Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis pp.186-205. 
44
 Neo-Nazi newspaper The Daily Stormer endorsed Trump on June 28, 2015. The American Nazi Party Report 
of September 20, 2015, described Trump’s candidacy as a ‘wonderful opportunity’. The Ku Klux Klan also 
supported, see Pastor Thomas Robb “Make America Great Again!” The Crusader: The Political Voice of White 
Christian America (Fall, 2016), p.1.  
outlawed discrimination.
45
 Indeed, Wallace first became prominent through his attempts to resist de-
segregation, long after the decision in Brown vs The Board of Education (1954). In 1963, as Governor 
of Alabama, he led a blockade against black students admitted to the University of Alabama. In doing 
so he fulfilled a campaign pledge to “stand in the schoolhouse door”.46 Instead of demonstrating a 
commitment to settled law, then, this phrase was used as a code to placate anti-segregationists and the 
white ‘backlash’ against civil rights.  At the same time, the term preyed on the fears of other members 
of the electorate that the social fabric of the country was threatened by rapid social, political and 
economic change.
47
 
Against this backdrop, Trump’s claim that he is ‘the law and order candidate’ only makes sense if 
understood as ‘jargon’. 
1. The phrase as used by Trump has no settled sense, whether by ‘ordinary’ use or by 
reference to some external concept. He accused others of ‘criminal’ behaviour, in a way that 
blurs the distinction between breach of criminal law and a colloquial expression for morally 
repugnant behaviour that may or may not actually involve breaking any specific law. He 
repeatedly referred to his opponent Hillary Clinton as ‘criminal’ and often described asylum 
seekers as ‘illegals’. Literal and figurative meanings are thus conflated. If something sounds a 
bit like it ought to be criminal, that is close enough.
48
 
2. More typical understandings of law as social ‘order’ are negated, they are not refuted. 
Trump dismissed protesters’ chants of ‘black lives matter’ with the popular far right response 
‘all lives matter’; he said very little on this matter beyond such dismissal. As with Goldwater 
and Wallace, Trump campaigned at a time of racial tension.  Like Goldwater and Wallace, the 
platform of restoring ‘law and order’ does not extend to the regulation of law enforcement, in 
                                                          
45
 Goldwater denounced Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954) long after it was established 
precedent. See Barry Goldwater The Conscience of a Conservative (Kentucky: Victor Publishing Company, 
1960) 
46
 See Dan T. Carter The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the origins of the New Conservatism, and the 
Transformation of American Politics (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisianna State University Press, 2000) pp.110-155 
47
 See Michael W. Flamm Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) pp.31-50 
48
 The Nazi concept of ‘law’ operated in a very similar way, see below, notes 81-83. 
the context of its treatment black citizens.  ‘Police lawlessness’ is, of course, one of the more 
fundamental ways in which public order might break down.
49
     
3. Trump did not define ‘law and order’.  Campaigning politicians rarely provide such 
definitions.  In this respect, Trump’s campaign was unremarkable to the unwitting voter – it is 
‘matter-of-fact’, ‘plain-speaking’, or ‘common sense’. There is nothing intellectual or unusual 
sounding in it. But the far right, as per Heidegger, listens to that which is ‘murmuring in the 
unsaid’.50 In contemporary parlance it is a ‘dog whistle’. The phrase avoids overtly racist 
language, which might put off moderate voters. Yet for those that are aware of the relevant 
history the Goldwater and Wallace allusions are clear.  Covert reference to overtly racist 
movements of the past, was, itself, a feature of Nazism; the term ‘The Third Reich’ was just 
such a reference.
51
 Throughout Trump’s campaign the far-right explicitly made these 
connections.  Richard Spencer coined the term ‘Alt-Right’.  In his address given at the Annual 
Conference for the National Policy Institute on 19
th
 November 2016, he spoke of ‘psychic 
link’ between Trump and ‘the movement’.52  This was a popular way to refer to the ‘spiritual 
connection’ or ‘calling’ or ‘unsaid’ during the Nazi era, the non-normative foundation for 
Schmitt’s jargon of ‘order’.  Spencer’s address ended, notoriously, with the lines “Hail 
Trump! Hail our people! Hail victory”, followed by Nazi salutes from some attendees.53  
Throughout the speech Spencer alluded to Nazi mythology, including the ‘people of the sun’ 
myth.
54
 He also used Heidegger’s term ‘overcoming’.55 
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 Op. cit., (n. 53). See also use of the phrase ‘Lügenpresse’ (“lying press”) among Trump supporters, “The ugly 
history of 'Lügenpresse,' a Nazi slur shouted at a Trump rally” Washington Post October 24, 2016. 
4. There is forceful repetition of the phrase, with no further elaboration. ‘Law and order’ is 
equated with ‘strength’ and little else. There was no attempt to address thorny issues as to 
how much of his platform might work legally. But such challenges did not deter the campaign 
from repeating the ‘law and order’ claim.  Many of his policy proposals were illegal. Some 
attacked First Amendment rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion.  He 
proposed strengthening libel laws, in particular against the press, in ways that are beyond the 
power of a president.
56
 And he made various (vacillating) proposals that specifically 
discriminate against Muslim Americans.
57
 Elsewhere, his proposals violated international law 
and human rights. He was in favour of torture, both as an interrogation technique and as a 
punishment.
58
  His policy towards national security involved targeted killing of the innocent 
family members of terror suspects.
59
 In each of these last two examples he ignores due 
process.  These are far from the only Trump policies to show such disregard.
60
  
5.  All is politics. Trump sees ‘law and order’ as inherently biased in favour of some interest. 
Any legal outcome with which he disagrees is seen as politically (or personally) motivated. It 
cannot possibly be the case for Trump that a proper application of law to fact might lead to an 
outcome that disadvantages him.  Infamously, when Judge Curiel decided a preliminary issue 
against Trump in a fraud case, Trump claimed bias on the basis of the judge’s ethnicity.61  
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation decided not to prosecute Hillary Clinton, Trump 
claimed that this was evidence of a ‘rigged system’.  
Given all of this, Trump only makes sense as a candidate that will stand up for ‘law and order’ if one 
accepts jargon. Otherwise, he is a candidate of sweeping law reform (at most generous).  Trump’s 
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 Republican Presidential debate, Fox Theatre, Detroit, Michigan March 3, 2016. See also Trump’s first 
television interview as president, ABC News, World News Tonight, January 24, 2017 
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 Op. cit. See also comments on Fox and Friends, Fox News, December 2, 2015. 
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speechwriters made numerous other ‘unsaid’ references to the history of far right American politics. 
The very slogan ‘America First’ has Anti-Semitic connotations.62 Trump referred to his support as 
‘the movement’63, alluded to ‘global conspiracies of bankers’64 and pledged to ‘stand up for America’, 
another Wallace slogan.
65
 The ‘intellectual’ wing of the contemporary far right understood each of 
these phrases (and many more) as ‘psychic’ indications of support throughout the campaign.66 
Trump’s success is but one example of a contemporary far-right political movement in a western 
liberal democracy that employs language in this way.  
How are we still falling for this? Part of the reason is the manner in which the underlying philosophy 
behind this jargon is deeply embedded in our culture. We see this most clearly in ‘critical’ reflections 
on Nazi law. 
 
III. Normalizing Jargon through Critical Theory 
Certain contemporary far-right figures cite Heidegger as a direct influence.
67
 But overtly far-right 
positions are still outside the academic mainstream; we are concerned with something far more central 
to our intellectual landscape.  Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth 
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Alexander Dugin Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning translated by Nina Kouprianova, 
(Whitefish, MT: Radix/Washington Summit Publishers, 2014). Heidegger’s work is in Radix’s list of “must 
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century. The breadth of his influence on scholarship means that Nazi jargon has been normalized as a 
form of discourse, in various ways, across a multitude of disciplines. It is part of a firmly established 
tradition in hermeneutics and philosophy.  It would be difficult to imagine a course on literary theory 
in the United States, for example, that did not include discussion of writers like Stanley Fish, Jacques 
Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Their ideas are so embedded that even those who have not 
attended university are likely to have been exposed to them in popular culture
68
.  This normalization of 
method leads to a normalization of substance. Even scholars who express abhorrence for Nazism on 
moral grounds, draw conclusions that normalize far-right claims when they employ this methodology. 
We can see a very clear example of this in relation to the Nazi concept of law. 
David Fraser’s Law After Auschwitz69 is a highly influential text. Kristen Rundle describes Fraser as 
‘the most important contemporary Anglo-American scholar of the relationship between law and the 
Holocaust’.70 His fundamental claim is that nothing conceptually distinguishes the Nazi notion of law 
from western, liberal, democratic notions. For Fraser, Nazi law was “perfectly normal”. 
In what follows, I will show that Fraser’s conclusion only follows from his analysis if one accepts 
Nazi jargon as valid. Fraser draws on the work of Fish and approvingly cites Derrida. Each considered 
Heidegger his biggest influence. Fraser also positively refers to both Heidegger and Schmitt.
71
   
At the very start of Fraser’s argument he claims that “law is in reality little more than the persuasive 
deployment of rhetorical devices”.72 In other words, it has no correlative or objective meaning – it is 
what the powerful say that it is.  But Fraser’s acceptance of Nazi jargon goes far deeper.  At every 
stage in his analysis of Nazi law the arguments that he makes require us to accept a broadly 
Heideggerian metaphysics.
73
 Without such an acceptance, his claims do not stand up to even brief 
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scrutiny. Fraser thus normalizes much more than just Nazi law in his conclusion, he also normalizes 
the Nazi ‘way of thinking’ in his method. In what follows, I show how this is the case in relation to 
four key concepts ‘health’, ‘volk’, ‘death’ and ‘community’.  
1. Health 
Fraser correctly notes that Nazi Germany was far from the only nation to engage in morally repugnant 
behaviour against the disabled on the basis of ‘public health’. Compulsory sterilization was not unique 
to Nazi law and policy. Neither was underlying racism. Neither was “eugenic discourse”.  Fraser 
highlights examples in Canada, Sweden and The United States.  He then makes the following claim: 
If lawyers in the United States…considered “eugenics”, or “racial hygiene” to be an 
acceptable normative underpinning for operative and operating legal measures with and 
upon the body politic, then it cannot simply be asserted, tout court, that Nazi law, with 
its grundnorm insuring the health and survival of the Volksgemeinschaft was a criminal 
aberration, unworthy of the name “law”.74 
This was no grundnorm. In Hans Kelsen’s jurisprudence, the ‘grundnorm’ is the fundamental building 
block for a normative system. Prescribed legal norms stem from it.
75
 By contrast, the jargon of 
‘health’ was used as a way of avoiding express rules in Nazi Germany. Its power lay in the ‘unsaid’ 
message that it sent to judges, lawyers, and police officers, without the creation of a normative 
system. 
‘Health’ in a Nazi context alluded to “the Hale life”.76  It was an example of how jargon conflated 
literal and figurative meaning. We can see this in Nazi legislation. The Law for the Restoration of the 
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(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,1984), What is a Thing? Translated by W.B. Barton Jr, and Vera 
Deutsch (Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1967). 
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Professional Civil Service 1933 involved a purge of the judiciary.
77
  One aim was to instate judges 
who “seek justice where it is born, in the healthy common sense of the people”.78  Far from being 
‘perfectly law-ful’, as Fraser claims, this was used as a means of by-passing prescribed legal rules if 
and when it suited the regime; as with Trump’s claims on the campaign trail in reference to his 
political opponents, if something sounded like the sort of thing that the regime would like to be 
illegal, then this was close enough.
79
 Reich Minister of Justice Otto Thierack encouraged judges to 
ignore specific rules and to judge instead on the basis of “a healthy prejudice”.80 This was put on a 
statutory footing with an amendment to the penal code known as the “Volk pest law” which justified 
‘punishment by analogy’ according to the gesundem Volksempfinden or ‘healthy perception of the 
Volk’.81  ‘Health’ in these contexts did not mean ‘of sound mind’ or ‘physically able’. The term was 
used in reference to the myth of ‘racial hygiene’ – the German as ‘healthy’, Jews, homosexuals, and 
the Romany as ‘unhealthy’.  But it also carried a connotation that only those who adhered to volkish 
populism were ‘healthy’. The ‘unsaid’ direction to judges was to ignore rule of law in favour of the 
outcome that ‘we’ would like, the ‘healthy’ outcome.82   
‘Health’ thus meant something like ‘loyalty to the regime’ in Nazi law. This jargon of health was 
fostered by the philosophical side of the movement. In Heidegger’s Rhectoral address to the Faculty 
of Medicine at Freiburg, he claimed that the meaning of ‘health’ is entirely relative to ‘peoples’. He 
went on to claim that for Germans, as for the ancient Greeks the true ‘spiritual’ notion of ‘health’ 
meant “being ready and strong to act in service of the state”.83  Fraser refers to Nazi claims about 
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Jurisprudence 3(2) (2012) p.445. Benson and Fink translate ‘gesundem Volksempfinden’ as ‘sound perception 
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 “Reden und andere Zuegnisse eines Lebensweges”, Hermann Heidegger ed., in Dieter Thomä, Heidegger 
Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Wirkung (Stuttgart, Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2003) the relevant section is translated 
public health as ‘medico-legal judgment par excellence’.84 This is only a ‘medico-legal’ judgment if 
you accept not only Nazi law as genuine law, but also Nazi ‘medicine’ as genuine medicine. Fraser 
does not distinguish between public health concerns on the basis of a real virus, and persecution in the 
name of public health on the basis of a metaphorical ‘parasite’.  He does not even question whether 
Nazi medicine should really be afforded the term ‘medicine’. As with law, it is enough that the 
powerful use the term. 
The notion of (public) health was used to achieve terrible, racist, objectives both in Allied 
jurisdictions and under Nazi law.  But Fraser’s failure to identify and distinguish the specific jargon of 
‘health’ disguises a raft of further wrongs.  Nazism used ‘health’ to also target political enemies, 
pacifists, and anyone else who disagreed with the regime.  Allied misuse of health as a justification 
for racial prejudice was wrong on its own terms. As Fraser notes, there was no legitimate justification 
in terms of mental or physical wellbeing for their actions.
85
 The Nazi jargon of public “health” was 
used for the very purpose that it was introduced, to target enemies of the volk.  
2. Volk 
‘Health’ was thus inextricably linked to volk and Volksgemeinschaft.  These terms were key pieces of 
Nazi jargon.  Fraser again equates Nazi jargon with its English translation. He describes Nazi use of 
the term ‘volk’ as a simple equivalent to ‘we the people’ in the American Constitution. This is not the 
case. 
‘People’ is an acceptable, literal, translation of ‘volk’. The concept of volk was indeed the main 
justification for state power.  It was referred to as the ultimate ‘source of all law’ by both Schmitt and 
Alfred Rosenberg (‘Commissar for Supervision of Intellectual and Ideological Education of the 
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Rockmore On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991) 
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(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp.233-290. 
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NSDAP’).86  Similarities end there. If Fraser had seen these terms as anything other than empty 
vessels into which one can pour whatever meaning one wishes, he would have seen the differences 
clearly. 
A vital distinction in liberal democracy is that between ‘public’ and ‘private’. In an American 
Constitutional context, this is the distinction between ‘people’ and ‘state’. One enjoys rights against 
the other. The state pledges to protect the rights of its citizens. ‘The people’ are, therefore, inherently 
distinct from the state apparatus.  In sharp contrast, Schmitt justified Nazi power on the basis of a 
‘triadic structure’.87  Under this structure, ‘state’, ‘movement’, and ‘volk’, were unified. The notion of 
being an ‘individual’ with ‘individual rights’ was negated as a ‘materialist’, ‘liberal’, ‘non-German’ 
notion.
88
  Rights came through membership of the volk – one could not, therefore, assert a right 
against the volk, without either asserting a right against oneself or admitting that one is not a member 
of the volk.  The notion of having a right against the state thus disappeared.
89
  An example will 
already be familiar.  The so-called ‘grudge-informer case’ was discussed in Fuller’s debate with 
H.L.A. Hart.  In that case a man had been found guilty in Nazi courts of ‘publically denouncing the 
Führer’.90  The remarks in question were alleged to have been made at home and between husband 
and wife.  Under any meaningful understanding of the term these remarks were private.  Nazi law’s 
jargon of ‘public’, however, rendered the distinction meaningless.  As there is no distinction between 
volk and individual, any statement to one person is a statement to all.  Any discussion was ‘public’.91  
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The phrase ‘we the people’ does have a chequered history. It refers to ‘free’ American citizens in the 
constitutional preamble.  At the time of drafting this was an exclusionary term.
92
 Yet volk was more 
exclusionary still. In a war-era work, Heidegger discusses the phrase ‘we the people’.  He emphasizes 
the definite article – “we are the people”.  Heidegger goes on to describe ‘the people’ as (variously) a 
‘body’ a ‘soul’ or a ‘spirit’. It is to be part of the natural ‘concrete order’ to which Schmitt also 
referred.
93
  Volk did not mean ‘German citizens’ in the way that we might use the term now. It 
specifically and exclusively referred to those Germans who had a sufficiently spiritual connection to 
‘the soil’.  “Volk” as “the people” excluded Jews, the disabled, travellers, communists, liberals, 
traditional conservatives, pacifists, intellectuals, Catholics, and ‘materialist’ (that is to say evidence-
based) scientists.  
Public justifications of state power, ‘emergency’ measures and disregard for prescribed rules were 
made by senior Nazi leaders on the basis of the ‘will of the volk’.94 But the reality was dictatorship. 
The volk as ultimate source of law actually meant an absence of any individual rights against the state.  
Fraser sees no difference between volk and people. He therefore sees no difference between a concept 
that was exclusionary, but salvageable, in a US context and a concept that was inherently even more 
exclusionary in a Nazi context.  He also sees no difference between people with constitutionally 
protected rights against a government, and a dictatorship that uses the term ‘people’ in its propaganda. 
3. Death  
Fraser concludes that The Holocaust was ‘legalized killing’. He claims that Auschwitz is best 
understood as a process of de-humanization of ‘the Jew’.  There we see the culmination of Nazi 
efforts to turn Jews into ‘muselmanner’, a concept Fraser borrows from Giorgio Agamben.95  
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1999).  Agamben often criticizes Heidegger. He does not adhere to Heidegger’s notion of meaning, for 
Concentration camp inmates used to refer to those that were too frail to work anymore as 
‘muselmanner’.96  Such inmates were resigned to their fate.  For Agamben, the muselmann represents 
a dead being in a human form.  The killing at Auschwitz was thus seen as extermination of the 
deceased instead of murder. This is a powerful example of Nazi jargon, a jargon of ‘death’.97 As such, 
it illustrates how Nazism self-justified by conflating the literal and the figurative. But Fraser uses this 
jargon to argue that The Holocaust was ‘lawful, scientific and ordinary’98.  
Since New York v. Eulo common law systems have defined death as the cessation of brain-stem 
function. Previously the test was cessation of heartbeat.
99
  But when the muselmann’s brain-stem 
ceases to function and his heart ceases to beat this is to be understood “not a loss of life but a loss of 
death”.100    
The ‘death’ of the muselmann is clearly not ‘death’ in a medico-legal sense, if ‘medicine’ and ‘law’ 
have either correlative or objective meaning.  As with Fraser’s claims about ‘health’ we are require to 
accept the Nazi jargon of medicine.  But Fraser’s claim that the The Holocaust is legalized killing, 
requires an acceptance of not only a jargon of “death”, but a great deal more besides.  
In his analysis, Fraser identifies the ‘myth’ involved in Nazi distinctions on racial grounds: 
The physical attributes of “the Jew” become inscribed in myth, legend and 
eventually science and law as the paradigmatic traits of the Other.
101
  
Fraser then points out how the myth of racial purity and the myth of racial health became entangled in 
the narrative of “the Jew” as unhealthy.  In Adorno’s terms, Nazism included a jargon of “Jew”. But 
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Fraser goes on to treat such embrace of ‘mythology’ as compatible with ‘science’. He does not 
consider, even briefly, more conventional notions of ‘science’ that would see myths to be debunked 
and self-doubt to be embraced.   
Fraser refers to ‘what was for them a scientific ideal of racial purity’ [emphasis added].102  On a more 
typical understanding of science, the practice can (and does) abandon certain beliefs over time, as we 
discover more.  In this respect, we might reasonably refer to a claim that was scientifically valid at one 
time but has since been disproven.  Thomas Kuhn’s notion of ‘scientific revolutions’ operates in this 
way.
103
  But Fraser espouses something far more relativist than Kuhn’s concept of ‘science’.  He 
claims that Nazism had ‘the latest discoveries of racial science’104 on its side [emphasis added]. He 
does not question whether racial ‘science’ was truly science even once.  
Nazi ‘science’ flew in the face of available evidence.105 Each of the core tenets of Nazi racial policy 
had been proven false long before 1933, let alone by the time transport trains began to arrive in 
Auschwitz in 1942.  To take one example, Maurice Fishburg’s 1913 work The Racial Characteristics 
of the Jews demonstrated that there were no physical traits to distinguish German Jews from non-
Jewish Germans.
106
  Nevertheless, judgements as to ethnicity for the purposes of Nazi racial laws were 
typically made on the basis of ‘physical traits’.  The ‘science’ or ‘biology’ behind this means of 
applying the law would not have had the ‘latest findings’ on its side in 1913, let alone 1942.  The same 
is true of every central claim that Nazism made about race and genetics, from criminal behaviour as 
‘inherited’ to claims about racial purity.107  The majority of German Jews were ‘Aryan’, by any 
defensible scientific means of testing such things.
108
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Fraser’s claims about ‘science’ and ‘scientific evidence’ only make sense if you accept the Nazi claim 
that science, itself, is relative to a ‘peoples’ – that there is ‘liberal science’, ‘Jewish science’, and 
‘Aryan science’. Heidegger expressed that view, so did Adolf Hitler.109 Throughout, Fraser claims that 
Auschwitz was “scientific”110 and “biological”111. But “Aryan-science” was a jargon of science.  
Similarly the “biological state” was a jargon of biology just as “racial purity” involved a jargon of 
“race” and “German physics” was a jargon of physics.112   
Fraser has not simply omitted the jargon of terms from his analysis.  He has accepted its underlying 
features. ‘Science’ is relative to ‘peoples’ on this worldview; it is a political tool with no objective or 
inter-subjective meaning. So, for Fraser, ‘myth’ and ‘science’ are not mutually exclusive. Using terms 
like ‘race’, ‘biology’, and ‘medicine’ in propaganda is enough to make a claim scientific.  In 
Heidegger’s terms, these are just ‘pieces of equipment’ that the powerful can fill with whatever 
definition suits their ends.  ‘Scientific evidence’ of ‘death’ is indistinguishable from ‘mythological 
evidence’ for a ‘dead person in human form’. 
4. Community 
The closest that Fraser comes to identifying an arbiter for word meaning is the notion of an 
‘interpretative community’, a term borrowed from Fish.113  Like Fish, Fraser holds that relevant 
community standards determine the meaning of a legal concept.  Everything from the meaning of a 
statute to what counts as scientific evidence is ‘interpretative’.  On this account, whatever is most 
persuasive to the relevant community decides the matter rather than some ‘objective’ truth or set of 
facts. Following Fish, Fraser holds that if Nazi lawyers felt that they were practicing law, then Nazi 
law was no less legal than any that of any contemporary Western liberal democracy. Fraser claims that 
this is how Nazi practitioners felt about their legal system.   
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Fraser’s claim about practitioner acceptance is inaccurate.  Many Nazi lawyers and judges expressed 
increasing levels of doubt about whether they were truly practicing law any more. Even the most 
committed Nazi members of the judiciary complained that the system was becoming chaotic.
114
  There 
is, however, a more fundamental problem. Unless we commit to some objective or inter-subjective 
identifier for the term ‘community’ this term cannot do the work that Fish and Fraser demand of it.115 
If we do so, however, it becomes clear that the Nazi “community” is, once again, jargon. 
Without doubt, there was a legal community of the Weimar era. But Nazi ‘bringing into line’ 
legislation dramatically altered the make-up of that community.  The ‘Law for the Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service’ concerned the judiciary and academia, among other professions.  It 
operated to remove non-Aryans
116
 and “[o]fficials who, on account of their past political activities 
cannot guarantee that they have always acted wholeheartedly for the national state”117.  The ‘Law 
Concerning Admission to the Legal Profession’, passed on the same day, excluded the same groups 
from legal practice.
118
 Shortly afterwards, a decree guaranteed that each remaining member would 
have “the respect owed to him as a member of his professional community”.119 This was a jargon of 
“professional community” in relation to the practice of law. It renders the notion of a “professional 
community standard” jargon.  This is so in two ways.       
First, consider the notion of a ‘community standard’. ‘Communities’ have internal debates and their 
own norms of behaviour. ‘Community standards’ emerge from within. Practice governs rules more 
than any external, prescribed, rules might govern practice, according to the Fish paradigm.
120
 All of 
Fish’s work on law is premised on this notion. But the Nazi ‘professional community’ was culled so as 
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to reflect the standards of a political movement external to that practice. Fish’s concept is on the horns 
of a dilemma. 
Fish could accept that there was a Nazi legal community.  Fraser does. But the notion of a self-
governing community, immune to external efforts to constrain interpretation, is meaningless if we 
accept the Nazi legal community as a ‘community’. Interpretation has been constrained (even dictated) 
by external forces through the removal of those that might disagree. So Fish (and Fraser) would have 
to accept as a ‘community’ one that has been manufactured in order to generate the interpretations 
desired. If this is so then ‘community standard’ is not the ultimate arbiter of meaning at all.   
Alternatively, Fish and those that follow him could accept that the Nazi legal ‘community’ is not 
really a community. This would be to distinguish a jargon of community from a genuine community.  
But doing so would mean that the notion of a ‘community’ does have a discoverable, objective, 
meaning, independent of the practice. Fish is clear that there can be no objective description of what 
counts as a ‘community’ for these purposes.  
So this is the first problem. ‘Community standard’ is meaningless unless we accept a set of criteria for 
community. 
Second, consider the more specific notion of a legal community.   The commonalities in this 
interpretive ‘community’ had more to do with their political persuasion than their profession.  Fish’s 
theory of an interpretive legal community is made up of individuals who instinctively see the world 
legally; they make sense of terms like ‘contract’ or ‘negligence’ because they have used them in 
practical contexts, multiple times. This is inspired by Heidegger’s claims about how we ‘Understand’ 
the world as pieces of ‘equipment’ that exist in-order-to.121  But much of the ‘community of Nazi 
lawyers’ had none of this ‘know-how’.  A prime example is the ‘People’s Court’,122 wherein lay 
appointees, chosen from military, police, and party, came to vastly outnumber professional judges.
123
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It is also worth noting that Fish (and Fraser) take the relevant interpretive community for standards of 
legality to come from the judicial branch and the ‘lawyers’ that argue before it.  But the Nazi executive 
had far more power in this respect. The Gestapo
124
 was granted authority to ‘correct’ or otherwise 
nullify judicial decisions on appeal to Thierack and Heinrich Himmler.
125
  A later decree allowed the 
Ministry of Justice to submit cases directly to Hitler, if it felt that a trial was ‘unnecessary’.126   
The interpretive community was the Nazi party, not a distinct legal profession wherein standards of 
meaning emerged organically.   The Western, liberal, notion of ‘legal community’ has values that 
serve as checks on political power. But the Nazi jargon of a ‘legal community’ was created in order to 
support the regime in anything that it wished. To point to the support of such a ‘community’ in these 
circumstances is meaningless.  Heidegger was the principal architect of the philosophy that created 
this jargon. His philosophical descendants, Fish and Fraser, cannot distinguish between a community 
and a jargon of community.
127
  
Neither Fraser nor Fish are Nazi sympathizers (or even close to it).  Fraser repeatedly emphasizes the 
moral bankruptcy of Nazism.
128
  Fish is highly critical of the decision in Collin v. Smith, which 
afforded Neo-Nazis the right to march through a predominantly Jewish area.
129
  They are not anti-
Semites. They are not racists. Nevertheless, their Heidegger-influenced methodology has led to 
substantive claims about law that serve to normalize far-right positions. These are far from the only 
examples. Heidegger was the main inspiration behind Fish’s claim that freedom of speech is an 
illusion.
130
 Oren Ben-Dor argues that Heidegger’s silence is a more ‘ethical’ response to The 
Holocaust than any active response through law.
131
  Philippe Nonet uses Heidegger’s later work to 
claim that modern law is nothing more than a ‘terrible power’ (presumably this includes civil rights 
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and due process).
132
   Academia has normalized jargon. For Fish, Fraser, (and others) Trump’s ‘law 
and order’ is no less valid than that of Fuller. Each may be accepted by different interpretative 
communities. But the interpretative community of alt-right, Neo-Nazis is no less valid than a 
community of jurisprudents.   
These are the clearest examples of a much broader phenomenon. In subtler ways, the normalization of 
this sort of discourse must be more pervasive than we could possibly imagine.  In its ‘ways of 
thinking’ and its ‘language’, our culture is Nazified; even those that disagree with such forms of 
analysis are unlikely to see them as unusual. This is part of the intellectual ‘background’ of our 
lawyers, journalists, politicians, business leaders, and, of course, voters. Schmitt and Heidegger tried 
to make future generations think of philosophy, reality, understanding, law, and order, in ways that 
facilitated National Socialist goals. They succeeded. The Trump campaign’s ability to appeal to the 
far-right, while not alienating a mainstream audience with its discourse, is in part a product of this 
success.  Learning the lessons from history in relation to Nazism must, therefore, include lessons at 
the most abstract philosophical levels. It is not enough to keep reminding the next generation that they 
ought to be tolerant or ought not to be racist. It is not enough to hope that those who experience the 
dire effects of violence and oppression will take the lessons from it. As we have just seen, acceptance 
of the underlying philosophy leaves us powerless to identify right-wing propaganda, distortion, and 
lies as anything out of the ordinary.  In my concluding remarks I make a suggestion as to how we 
might continue to present this material in a way that places its most basic defect at the forefront.  In 
this way, perhaps, our discourse on law and policy might become less susceptible to jargon. 
 
IV. ‘Being Wrong’ as a Fundamental Existentiale 
To reject philosophical jargon we must reject its very first step – the abandonment of objective or 
inter-subjective word meaning.  Each further step is premised on acceptance of this first one. If words 
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have an objective or inter-subjective meaning then we can immediately reject racial ‘science’ as 
science, Nazi ‘health’ as health or Trumpian ‘law and order’ as law and order.  
For analytical philosophers, this rejection is straightforward even without taking a position as to 
whether word meaning is objectively or inter-subjectively determined. We get things wrong. This is 
so in spite of how convinced we may be, or how badly we may wish to believe something. The radical 
relativism of jargon does not allow for this.  Heidegger provides no account of when we are simply 
incorrect in our beliefs, even in his early, pre-Nazi, work.  
For Heidegger, knowledge is typically ‘know-how’ rather than ‘knowledge of’.  He uses the term 
‘Understanding’ to distinguish his position.  Most of us, most of the time, do not attempt to 
‘Understand’ by examination.  Instead, we Understand by doing – if we want to understand a hammer, 
we pick it up and use it.
133
  In Heidegger’s terms, our world appears fundamentally ready-to-hand for 
us.  In fact, the more that we stare at the ‘hammer-thing’ (in the manner of René Descartes with his 
ball of wax) the less we Understand it. We make things part of our “world”.   
There is an obvious flaw in this starting point.  What of those moments when we do not understand 
something, when things appear uncertain, or downright confusing?  Heidegger describes such 
moments as ‘present-at-hand’.  Here he extends his analogy; if we normally Understand the world 
around us as various pieces of equipment, the present-at-hand moment that Descartes experienced 
occurs when such equipment appears broken.  In such moments we put the broken equipment back 
together, by seeing how it fits with the ‘totality’ of other pieces of equipment in our lives.  This is as 
close as Heidegger gets to the notion of belief justification in epistemology. It bears some similarity to 
‘coherentist’ accounts – a belief is justified if it ‘fits’ with my pre-existing beliefs.134  But Heidegger 
does not acknowledge the possibility that a belief (or ‘Understanding’) could be so utterly wrong that 
it ought to be jettisoned.
135
  On the Heideggerian account we can never be that wrong about the world 
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around us. His later work does not address this issue at all; the concept ‘Thinking’ that emerges in his 
later focuses on ‘uncovering’ further possibilities for our Being through a non-instrumental, ‘draft’ of 
pure Thoughtfulness’ – the possibility that we are entirely in error plays no part in his account.136 
What if I were under the impression that Lyon was the capital of France? Under a coherentist account 
of belief justification I would soon find out that my belief was unjustifiable.  I might look to various 
sources that I believe to be credible, ask people that I believe have the appropriate knowledge, and 
decide that I was, simply, wrong.  For Heidegger, on the other hand, this broken equipment would be 
made to fit with the totality of my other pieces of equipment.  That might look something like the 
following: Lyon may not be the official capital, but it is widely considered to be the gastronomic 
capital.  Since France is world-renounced for its cuisine, Lyon is really more of a capital than Paris.  I 
do not confront my wrongness here.  I certainly do not admit to a mistake.  I ‘overcome’ it.137   I find a 
way to make my position defensible all along.   
The Heideggerian account is unsatisfactory to the analytical philosopher.  It does not really accept that 
we are flat out incorrect.  This fundamental flaw on a theoretical level is a natural bedfellow for ‘post-
fact’ public discourse; every claim is right on some level. But this, analytical, objection only gets us 
so far as a response to jargon for two reasons.  First, Heidegger’s influence is far less pronounced in 
that tradition.  Even those that expressly admit some influence, do so in a very qualified way; Donald 
Davidson’s broadly anti-Cartesian position is only vaguely Heideggerian and does admit to flat out 
error; Richard Rorty is as much a critic of Heidegger as a follower. None simply follows Heidegger 
unquestioningly and to the letter (in the manner of Ben-Dor or Nonet). The sorts of philosophers that 
explore issues around philosophy of language and belief justification are not really keeping 
Heidegger’s philosophy alive.  To address the perpetuation of his ideas, we need to address those that 
speak to his fundamental concerns.  Second, and more substantively, this analytical objection might 
                                                          
136
 What is Called Thinking p.17. Perhaps the best introduction to this concept for lawyers is that of Linda Ross 
Meyer “Is Practical Reason Mindless?” Georgetown Law Journal 86 (1998), 647. For an attempt to ‘Think’ 
about Law see Ben-Dor Thinking About Law. 
137
 This Heideggerian term became common in Nazism, see Bourdieu Political Ontology pp.vii, 60-65, 67-68, 
94-96, 99, Schmitt Three Types, pp.48-49. Rosenberg claimed that the movement was ‘doing God’s work’; 
contradictory messages from church and scripture should be ‘overcome’ Myth of the Twentieth Century pp.117, 
204-211, 247-249, 280-288, 309-386, 426-427. Spencer, speaks of how ‘Europeans’ are ‘meant to overcome’ 
history, regulation and politics, op. cit.,(n.53). 
highlight how perpetuating this philosophy allows our politics to become ‘post-fact’ or ‘post-truth’.  
But it does not explain why it this is so amenable to a rise in far-right authoritarianism.  Why does a 
lack of truth lead to a lack in humanity?   
For Heidegger, once we ‘overcome’ mind-world issues, the important questions in philosophy are 
revealed to be questions of Being.  Many have found this step tremendously liberating.
138
 But 
Heidegger never considered what we might lose in terms of our Being if we ‘overcome’ wrongness in 
the way that he imagines. As Hannah Arendt pointed out, the ‘chief qualification’ of an authoritarian 
leader is ‘infallibility’.  He or she ‘can never admit an error’.139 Heidegger should have added ‘Being-
wrong’ to modes of “Being” that he addresses. Instead of some aberration, limited to the foolish 
mistakes of silly philosophers, “Being-wrong” is as much part of the essence of human experience as 
“Being-with others”, “Being-in-the-world” or “Being-towards-death”.140 ‘To err is human’. We need 
to accept this. We need to embrace self-doubt.  All of the best Heidegger inspired work gives us 
something to fill this wrongness void. Levinas, for example, takes our encounter with ‘the Other’ as 
primordial in the face of which I am ‘faulty’.  Ethics thus takes priority over ontology.141 As with our 
over-reliance on ‘technology’,142 to ignore our own wrongness, our own fallibility, is to make us less 
human. Heidegger claimed that ‘only a god can save us’. Gods are never wrong. Gods are never 
human. It is no coincidence that many of the most tyrannical despots in history have deified 
themselves.  It is no coincidence that they rarely, if ever, admit to mistakes.  It is no surprize that a so-
called humanism that fails to identify ‘being-wrong’ as a central part of the human condition should be 
appeal to dictators and authoritarians.  
We must place this ‘fallibility challenge’ at the centre of engagement with Heidegger-influenced 
theory. Such engagement takes many forms, from the manner in which we present such accounts to 
students to the demands that we make of colleagues who espouse this tradition in their work. If our 
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approach to philosophy can have broader effects through culture and education then accepting the fact 
that we get things wrong might impact out political culture for the better. We might, eventually, create 
a culture in which reassessment in light of evidence is seen as a virtue in public figures, instead of a 
‘lack of conviction’ or ‘weakness’.  Perhaps public debate might become more about the best 
argument and less about who can shout loudest.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
